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Abstract:  
This study examined the effect of corporate governance on financial performance of 
selected deposit money banks. Corporate governance is an important issue because of 
the rise in corporate scandal suffered by corporate organizations arising from insider 
abuse by management board, and other financial recklessness. Specifically, the effect of 
board ownership structure, audit committee, independence, age and block shareholding 
on return on assets, return on equity and earnings per share of selected deposit money 
banks quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) were ascertained. The result of the 
analysis using panel data from 2005 to 2017 established that corporate governance 
practice has significant effect on financial performance of deposit money banks in 
Nigeria, however, such effect is marginal considering the number of corporate 
governance variables that significantly affect return on assets, return on equity and 
earnings per share. In this regard, appointment into the board should be on the bases of 
age and experience not on friendship since it positively relates to performance and to the 
probability of disciplinary management turnover in poorly performing banks. Board 
members should not be encouraged to have too much stake in the ownership structure 
of the banks as it is negatively related with performance. The holding of block shares of 
 
i Correspondence: email amalision4ltd@yahoo.com  
Benson Aisagbonbuomwan Esan, Amalachukwu Chijindu Ananwude, Ijeoma Chinwe Okeke 
EFFECT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF SELECTED DEPOSIT 
 MONEY BANKS QUOTED ON THE NIGERIAN STOCK EXCHANGE (2005 – 2017)
 
European Journal of Economic and Financial Research - Volume 4 │ Issue 1 │ 2020                                                         45 
the banks by individuals, institutional investors or agencies should be discouraged 
because block shareholding could induce the prioritization of self-interest by block 
shareholders and the consequent expropriation of firm resources, resulting in decreased 
bank performance. 
 
JEL: G30; G34; G21 
 
Keywords: corporate governance; financial performance; banks 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
There has been a wide variety of attention among researchers, scholars, governments and 
global agencies on corporate governance after high profile collapse of a number of large 
companies that led to the bankruptcy of many institutions in the world. Most of the 
corporate scandals revolved around accounting fraud involving directors and managers 
of corporations. The corporate crises and scandals have resulted in a loss of confidence 
in corporate financial reporting, leaving business management in a difficult position 
(Ejuvbekpokpo & Esuike, 2013). Revelations of corporate fraud all over the world in the 
past years and the historical antecedents in financial practices have indicated that 
financial crisis is the direct consequence of poor corporate governance (Uwuigbe & 
Fakile, 2012). Corporate governance is defined as rules and regulations that ensure that a 
company is governed in a transparent and accountable manner such that the company 
survives and meets the expectation of its shareholders, creditors and other stakeholders 
(Akpan & Amran, 2014). Corporate governance is not just corporate management; it also 
involves a fair, efficient and transparent administration to meet certain well-defined 
objectives (McIntyre, Murphy & Mitchell, 2007). It is a system of structuring, operating 
and controlling a company with a view to achieving strategic goals to satisfy 
shareholders, creditors, employees, customers etc. and complying with the legal and 
regulatory requirements, apart from meeting environmental and local community needs. 
An important theme of corporate governance is the nature and extent of accountability 
of particular individuals in the organization and mechanisms that try to reduce or 
eliminate the principal–agent problem (Akingunola, Olusegun & Adedipe, 2015). 
Corporate governance is set out to improve management oversight and increases 
disclosure and quality of reported financial information as well as the information 
asymmetry between managers and capital providers (Coles, McWilliams & Sen, 2001). 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) posit that the overall effect of corporate governance could 
be the strengthening of investors’ confidence in the economy of a particular country, sub-
region, or region.  
 The increasing incidence of corporate fraud relating to exaggerated and overstated 
accounts have informed the renewed global emphasis on the need for effective corporate 
governance. Such incidence raised concern in the United States with the collapse of the 
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energy corporation Enron in 2001 which filed for bankruptcy after adjusting its accounts. 
WorldCom, Global Crossing and Rank Xerox are other companies in the United States 
with similar problem. In Europe, big corporations such as Parmalat, Hollinger 
Incorporation, Adephia Communications Company and Tyco International Limited, 
revealed significant and deep-rooted problems in their corporate governance leading to 
financial scandals (Oki & Maimako, 2015). There is a plethora of literatures which 
attribute the collapse of financial institutions in developing economies like Nigeria to 
poor corporate governance standard, corruption and lack of transparency. For instance, 
the country witnessed a near collapse of the financial sector in the early 1990s through 
the occurrence of failed banks and other financial institutions. In a bid to curb this 
menace, the Failed Banks (Recovery of Debt) and Financial Malpractice in Banks Act 1993 
was promulgated to facilitate the prosecution of those who contributed to the failure of 
banks and to recover the debt owed to the failed banks. Financial institutions such as 
Savannah Bank and Societe Generale Bank of Nigeria were few of the deposit money 
banks affected. Several reasons which included the ineffectiveness of the board as well as 
the ineptitude and instability of the management; the false and unreliable returns to the 
regulatory authorities; the insolvent and deteriorating financial position of the banks and 
the urgent need to protect the interest of depositors, both existing and prospective and 
the banking system and the inability of the bank to respond to various regulatory 
initiatives were adduced as reasons for the financial crisis in the defunct banks (Uwuigbe, 
2011). In a related case, the operating license of Peak Merchant Bank was revoked due to 
poor corporate governance practices by the Central Bank of Nigeria because of over 
bearing influence of the Chairman who was also the majority shareholder of the bank.  
 There were also reported cases of persistent liquidity problem; poor asset quality; 
significant insider abuses; poor track of profitability; lack of seriousness; inability and 
unwillingness of shareholders to recapitalize; reckless granting of credits; complete 
absence of focus and lack of corporate governance being perpetuated by the sanctioned 
banks. Despite the alleged role of corporate governance (if fully complied with by banks) 
in improving financial performance of banks, finding vary according to countries. This 
calls for context specific research to provide evidence based conclusions regarding its 
specific effect across different variables of financial performance. From empirical 
literature in the context of Nigeria on corporate governance and financial performance, 
the conventional measure of financial performance of banks are return on assets and 
return on equity (see Adigwe, Nwanna & John, 2016; Abdulazeez, Ndibe & Mercy, 2016; 
Ajala, Amuda & Arulogun, 2012; Mohammed, 2012; Osisioma, Egbunike & Adeaga, 2015; 
Ene & Alem, 2016; Akingunola, Olusegun & Adedipe, 2015; Osuagwu, 2013; Akingunola 
& Olusegun, 2013; Ayorinde, Toyin & Leye, 2012; Uwuigbe, 2011; etc.) thus the need to 
expand the surrogate for measuring financial performance of deposit money banks to 
accommodate earnings per share. Consequently, this study examines the effect of 
corporate governance on financial performance of selected deposit money banks quoted 
on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. 
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 After this introduction, the remainder of the study is divided as follows: section 
two reviews previous literature; section three depicts the methodological approach 
employed; section four discusses the findings from the application of econometric tools, 
while section five summarizes and concludes the study. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
There has been no generally accepted definition or classification of corporate governance. 
However, the definitions of corporate governance given by researchers are not 
significantly different (Adigwe, Nwanna & John, 2016; Uwuigbe & Fakile, 2012; Ujunwa, 
2012; Osuagwu, 2013). The different definitions could be attributed to divergent 
economic, social and ethical world views about the concept of corporate governance. 
Consequently, researchers and policy makers tend to define the concept from the 
perspectives of their ethical, political, economic and legal viewpoint. For the purpose of 
this study and consistent with previous studies, the definition derived by the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is used. The OECD 
(2004) defines corporate governance as a set of relations between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance 
also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. It is the 
system of rules, practices and processes by which a company is directed and controlled. 
It essentially involves balancing the interests of a company's many stakeholders, such as 
shareholders, management, customers, suppliers, financiers, government and the 
community. Traditionally the main medium for communicating corporate governance 
practices has been through company annual reports. In the view of Neifar and Haliou 
(2013), high-quality corporate disclosure helps investors and other capital market 
participants by enabling them to make proper assessment of the potential risks and 
rewards of alternative investments. Well-informed investment decision-making by 
capital market participants leads to efficient allocation of capital, which promotes 
productivity and economic growth. A strong disclosure regime is a pivotal feature of 
market-based monitoring of corporate conduct and is central to the ability of 
shareholders to exercise their voting rights effectively. 
 Theoretical work on corporate governance has produced a number of theories as 
to the motivation of firms to report or disclose information on their corporate governance 
activities, most deriving from the broad theory called political economy theory which is 
defined as the social, political and economic framework within which human life takes 
place (Gray, Kouhy & Lavers as cited in Uwuigbe & Fakile, 2012). We limited this study 
to agency theory and stakeholders’ theory. Agency theory explains the agency problems 
arising from the separation of ownership and control. It provides a useful way of 
explaining relationships where the parties’ interests are at odds and can be brought more 
into alignment through proper monitoring and a well-planned compensation system 
(Davis, Schoormann & Donaldson, 1997). In her assessment and review of agency theory, 
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Eisenhardt (1989) outlines two streams of agency theory that have developed over time: 
Principal-agent and positivist. Principal-agent research is concerned with a general 
theory of the principal-agent relationship, a theory that can be applied to any agency 
relationship e.g. employer- employee or lawyer-client. On the other side positivist 
researchers have tended to focus on identifying circumstances in which the principal and 
agent are likely to have conflicting goals and then describe the governance mechanisms 
that limit the agent’s self-serving behaviour (Eisenhardt, 1989). Stakeholders have been 
identified as those groups who have an interest in the actions of the corporation. 
Furthermore, a stakeholder has been defined as ‘any individual or group who can affect 
or is affected by the actions, decisions, policies, practices, or goals of the organization. 
 In the course of reviewing empirical studies, we did not follow the orthodox style 
that elucidates methodological approach employed by authors, period covered, etc., 
rather we hinged on the major findings of the authors. Empirical findings on the alleged 
nexus between corporate governance and financial performance of banks are 
controversial. Studies such as Guo, Langston and Hadley (2003), Naushad and Malik 
(2015), Abobakr (2017), Abdulazeez, Ndibe and Mercy (2016), Ahmed, Zannat and 
Ahmed (2017), Mohammed (2012), Osisioma, Egbunike and Adeaga (2015), Utama and 
Musa (2011), Okiro, Aduda and Omor (2015), Ene and Alem (2016), Al-Baidhani (2016), 
Akingunola, Adekunle and Adedipe (2015), Akingunola and Olusegun (2013), Ayorinde, 
Toyin and Leye (2012), Adams and Mehran (2005), Hoque, Islam and Ahmed (2013), 
Ajanthan, Balaputhiran and Nimalathashan (2013), Ogege and Boloupremo (2014), Belhaj 
and Mateus (2016), Sakilu and Kibret (2015), Odili, Ezeudu and Orikara (2015), Dzingai 
and Fakoya (2017), Shungu, Ngirande and Ndlovu (2014), Malik, Wan, Ahmad, Naseem 
and Rehman (2014) and Ahmed (2017) documented positive relationship between 
variables of corporate governance and financial performance of banks. Sakawa and 
Watanabel (2011), Grove, Patelli, Victoravich and Pisum (2011), Ajala, Amuda and 
Arulogun (2012), Ashfaq and Saeed (2017), Dogan and Yildiz (2013), Ashenafi, Kalifa and 
Yodit (2013), Uwuigbe (2011), Pan (2014), Filip, Vesna and Kiril (2014), Ermina (2010), 
Bebeji, Mohammed and Tanko (2015), Bussoli, Gigante and Tritto (2015), Dincer and 
Dincer (2013) and Alam and Akhter (2017) reported negative linkage between variables 
of corporate governance and financial performance. with regards to effect, Adigwe, 
Nwanna and John (2016), Kaur (2014), Aldalayeen (2017), Changezi and Saeed (2013), 
Kusuma and Ayumardani (2016), Osuagwu (2013), Srairi (2015), Akpan and Rilman 
(2012) and Okoye, Evbuomwan, Achugamonu and Araghan (2016) found that corporate 
governance has significant effect on banks’ financial performance. On the other hand, the 
studies of Xavier, Shukla, Oduor and Mbabazize (2015), Ahmed, Ullah, Ahmed and 
Rahman (2016), Kigera (2012), Aulia (2013), Herawanto and Maman-Kusman (2017), 
Ahmad and Mensur (2012), Thuraisingam (2013) and Abdul-Qadir and Kwanbo (2012) 
revealed no significant effect of corporate governance on banks performance. 
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3. Mathematical Modelling 
 
3.1 Population, Data Source and Description 
The population of this study consists of fifteen (15) deposit money banks quoted on the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange as at March, 2018 (NSE Market Report, March 30th 2018). A 
sample size of ten (10) banks were purposively selected and utilized for the study. The 
ten (10) deposit money banks are Access Bank, Diamond Bank, Fidelity Bank, First Bank 
of Nigeria, First City Monument Bank, Guarantee Trust Bank, Sterling Bank, United Bank 
for Africa, Wema Bank and Zenith Bank. We utilize annual time series data from the 
financial statement/annual reports of these deposit money banks from 2005 to 2017. The 
choice of the dependent variables and explanatory variables were influence by some 
authors. The dependent variables: return on assets (see Adigwe, Nwanna & John, 2016; 
Abobakr, 2017; Ene & Alem, 2016), return on equity (see Odili, Ezeudu & Orikara, 2015; 
Hoque, Islam & Ahmed, 2013) and earnings per share (see Alam &Akhter, 2017; Ermina, 
2010). For the corporate governance variables: board ownership (see Adigwe, Nwanna & 
John, 2016; Ene & Alem, 2016), board independence (see Pan, 2014), board audit 
committee (see Shungu, Ngirande & Ndlovu, 2014), board age (see Federe, 2012) and 
block shareholding (see Gogantopoulous &Filos, 2017). The control variable are bank’s 
size (see Federe, 2012) and bank’s debt structure (see Pan, 2014). The dependent variables 
are Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE) and Earnings per Share (EPS). The 
independent variables are the indicators of corporate governance mechanism through 
Board Ownership (BodOwn) Board Independence (BodInd) Board Audit Committee 
(BodAud), Board Age (BodAge) and Board Block Shareholding (BodBsh). The control 
variables are Bank’s Size (Bsize) and Bank’s Debt Structure (BDS). 
 
3.2 Model Specification 
The effect of corporate governance of financial performance was estimated via Granger 
Causality test, whereas the ordinary relationship was undertaken using the Panel 
Ordinary Least Square (POLS) performed in three sets: pooled OLS, Fixed and Random 
effect. Our model is influenced by Uwuigbe (2011) and modified in functional form as in 
Equ. 1 – 3 and in log transformation as in Equ. 4 – 6. 
 
3.3 Functional Form 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 𝑓(𝐵𝑜𝑑𝑂𝑤𝑛, 𝐵𝑜𝑑𝐴𝑢𝑑, 𝐵𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑, 𝐵𝑜𝑑𝐴𝑔𝑒, 𝐵𝑠ℎ, 𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝐵𝑑𝑠)            (Equ.1) 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 = 𝑓(𝐵𝑜𝑑𝑂𝑤𝑛, 𝐵𝑜𝑑𝐴𝑢𝑑, 𝐵𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑, 𝐵𝑜𝑑𝐴𝑔𝑒, 𝐵𝑠ℎ, 𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝐵𝑑𝑠)            (Equ.2) 
 
𝐸𝑃𝑆 = 𝑓(𝐵𝑜𝑑𝑂𝑤𝑛, 𝐵𝑜𝑑𝐴𝑢𝑑, 𝐵𝑜𝑑𝐼𝑛𝑑, 𝐵𝑜𝑑𝐴𝑔𝑒, 𝐵𝑠ℎ, 𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝐵𝑑𝑠)       (Equ.3)                             
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3.4 Econometric Form 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎1𝐵𝑜𝑑𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎2𝐵𝑜𝑑𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎3𝐵𝑜𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎4𝐵𝑜𝑑𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 +
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎5𝐵𝑠ℎ𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎6𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 + 𝐵7𝐵𝑑𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡       (Equ.4)
                                                                                                   
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎1𝐵𝑜𝑑𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎2𝐵𝑜𝑑𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎3𝐵𝑜𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎4𝐵𝑜𝑑𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 +
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎5𝐵𝑠ℎ𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎6𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 + 𝐵7𝐵𝑑𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡         (Equ.5)
                                                                                                 
 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡 = 𝐵0 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎1𝐵𝑜𝑑𝑂𝑤𝑛𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎2𝐵𝑜𝑑𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎3𝐵𝑜𝑑𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎4𝐵𝑜𝑑𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 +
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎5𝐵𝑠ℎ𝑡 + 𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑎6𝐵𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡 + 𝐵7𝐵𝑑𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑡      (Equ.6)
                                                                                                   
 
Where: 
ROA = Return on Assets 
ROE = Return on Equity 
EPS = Earnings per Share 
BodOwn = Board Ownership 
BodAud = Board Audit Committee  
BodInd= Board Independence 
BodAge = Board Age 
Bsh = Board Block Shareholding 
Bsize = Banks’ Size 
Bds = Banks’ Debt Structure 
e = Stochastic or disturbance term. 
t = Time dimension of the variables  
β0 = Constant or intercept 
Β1 – 5 = Coefficients to be estimated or the coefficients of slope parameters 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Data 
Table 1 reveals the descriptive characteristics of the data from 2005 to 2017. It shows the 
mean, standard deviation, maximum, minimum and total number of observations. The 
mean values of the variables: ROA, ROE, EPS, BODOWN, BODAUD, BODIND, 
BODAGE, BSH, BSIZE and BDS are 1.67, 8.654923, 89.92, 9.84, 50.15, 42.88, 50.24 76.62, 
1.10 and 78.88 respectively. The maximum values of the series are 20.08 for ROA, 40.30 
for ROE, 548.00 for EPS, 44.15 for BODOWN, 60.00 for BODAUD, 90.00 for BODIND, 
60.80 for BODAGE, 95.97 for BSH, 4.43 for BSIZE and 136.53 for BDS, while the minimum 
values are -24.80, -162.49, -573.00, 0.00, 50.00, 6.67, 35.00, 0.09, 19435289 and 0.79 ROA, 
ROE, EPS, BODOWN, BODAUD, BODIND, BSH, BSIZE and BDS respectively. The 
standard deviation of the variables are 3.53 for ROA, 19.17 for ROE, 123.23 for EPS, 11.53 
for BODOWN, 1.24 for BODAUD, 20.17 for BODIND, 5.54 for BODAGE, 15.39 for BSH, 
1.02 for BSIZE and 21.54 for BDS. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Data 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
Panel A: Financial Performance      
ROA 1.665846 3.529535 -24.80000 20.08000 130 
ROE 8.654923 19.16638 -162.4900 40.30000 130 
EPS 89.92308 123.2287 -573.0000 548.0000 130 
Panel B: Corporate Governance       
BODOWN 9.841231 11.52918 0.000000 44.15000 130 
BODAUD 50.15385 1.235530 50.00000 60.00000 130 
BODIND 42.87623 20.17461 6.670000 90.00000 130 
BODAGE 50.24585 5.542050 35.00000 60.80000 130 
BSH 76.61569 15.39414 0.090000 95.97000 130 
Panel C: Control Variables      
BSIZE 1.10E+09 1.02E+09 19435289 4.43E+09 130 
BDS 78.88038 21.54794 0.790000 136.5300 130 
Note: Mean = mean of the variables from 2005 to 2017; Std. Dev. = standard deviations of the variables; Min. & Max. = Minimum and maximum values of the 
variable, whereas Obs. = number of observations of the variables 
 
4.2 Test for Multicollinearity 
The correlation matrix estimation is a way of detecting multi-collinearity in any model. The presence of multi-collinearity between the 
independent variable results in biased regression output. The correlation matrix in Table 2 indicates that the highest correlation between 
the independent variables is -0.62 for BODAUD and BSH. The correlation of 0.62 between board audit committee and block shareholding 
is within the acceptable range of no high correlation. In this regard, this study concludes that there is no multi-collinearity issue between 
the corporate governance indices that applied in this study. 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
 ROA ROE EPS BODOWN BODAUD BODIND BODAGE BSH BSIZE BDS 
ROA 1.0000          
ROE 0.8074 1.00000         
EPS 0.4258 0.49754 1.00000        
BODOWN -0.238 -0.21570 -0.18155 1.000000       
BODAUD -0.026 0.02206 -0.04371 0.057509 1.000000      
BODIND -0.067 -0.03738 0.02651 -0.038641 -0.163000 1.000000     
BODAGE 0.1444 0.13551 0.26412 -0.261773 -0.198024 0.455384 1.000000    
BSH -0.030 -0.12832 -0.15481 0.126356 -0.623505 0.202916 0.137882 1.00000   
BSIZE 0.1294 0.24517 0.49043 -0.170725 -0.101712 0.121367 0.520937 0.00625 1.00000  
BDS -0.136 0.00747 0.05805 -0.030391 0.049643 -0.308378 -0.282189 -0.11795 0.25223 1.00000 
Source: Output data from E-views 10.0. 
 
4.3 Panel Unit Root Test  
This study applies the Levin, Lin and Chu (LLC) Test and Breitung unit root tests which were performed at level and first difference. 
From the unit root output in Tables 3 – 4, the variables were found to be stationarity thus devoid of stationarity defect that are typical 
of most time series data. 
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Table 3: LLC Test Result 
Variables LLC Test Statistic Pooled Coefficient Pooled t-Stat. Remark 
Panel A: Financial Performance     
ROA -2.62804 (0.04)** -0.99955 -9.535 Stationary/1(0) 
ROE -4.90276 (0.00)* -1.64172 -12.253 Stationary/1(1) 
EPS -3.18804 (0.04)** -0.76777 -6.800 Stationary/1(0) 
Panel B: Corporate Governance     
BODOWN -1.84667 (0.03)** -0.39807 -5.233 Stationary/1(0) 
BODAUD -6.43184 (0.00)* -1.96974 -9.424 Stationary/1(1) 
BODIND -3.45930 (0.00)* -1.45545 -9.955 Stationary/1(1) 
BODAGE -5.97012 (0.00)* -1.46179 -10.583 Stationary/1(1) 
BSH -22.6734 (0.00)* -0.57762 -22.422 Stationary/1(0) 
Panel C: Control Variables     
BSIZE -3.18116 (0.00)* -1.28532 -8.461 Stationary/1(1) 
BDS -3.64488 (0.00)* -0.74670 -8.010 Stationary/1(0) 
Source: Output data from E-views 10.0 
Note: * and ** denote significance level at 1% and 5% respectively, whereas 1(0) and 1(1) represent integration order at level and first difference accordingly. 
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Table 4: Breitung Unit Root 
Variables LLC Test Statistic Pooled Coefficient Pooled t-Stat. Remark 
Panel A: Financial Performance     
ROA -2.21230 (0.00)* -0.26835 -2.212 Stationary/1(0) 
ROE -4.43518 (0.00)* -0.56582 -4.435 Stationary/1(0) 
EPS -3.25384 (0.00)* -0.41279 -3.254 Stationary/1(0) 
Panel B: Corporate Governance      
BODOWN -3.26735 (0.00)* -0.46641 -3.267 Stationary/1(1) 
BODAUD -4.00507 (0.00)* -0.00096 -0.005 Stationary/1(1) 
BODIND -4.82863 (0.00)* -0.14506 -0.829 Stationary/1(1) 
BODAGE -5.77888 (0.00)* -0.94921 -5.779 Stationary/1(1) 
BSH -2.06699 (0.04)** -0.10909 -1.067 Stationary/1(1) 
Panel C: Control Variables     
BSIZE -2.29040 (0.01)* -0.35688 -2.290 Stationary/1(1) 
BDS -1.83027 (0.03)** -0.14597 -1.830 Stationary/1(0) 
Source: Output data from E-views 10.0 
Note: The optimal lag for LLC test is selected based on the Schwarz Info Criteria (SIC), No spectral estimation method for Breitung unit root test, p-values are in 
parentheses where (*) and (**) denote significance at 1% and 5% respectively. 
 
4.4 Kao Residual Co-integration Test 
The structural criteria for estimation the Kao panel Co-integration test is based on Engle-Granger. Kao (1999) notes that the null 
hypothesis of no co-integration for panel data exists in two test. The first is a Dickey-Fuller types test, while the other is an Argumented 
Dickey-Fuller type test. Table 5 depicts the Kao’s co-integration test for financial performance indices of deposit money banks and 
corporate governance mechanism in Nigeria. The p-values of the t-statistics for all the model are significant at 5% level of significance, 
which is the rejection of the null hypothesis of no co-integration for financial performance indices of deposit money banks and corporate 
governance. Put differently, return on assets, return on equity and earnings per share are related in long run with corporate governance 
variables of board ownership structure, audit committee, independence, age and block shareholding. 
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Table 5: Kao Residual Co-integration Test 
Models Estimated Argumented Dickey-Fuller 
 t-Statistic Prob. 
ROA →   BODOWN + BODAUD + BODIND + BODAGE + BSH+BSIZE+BDS -15.57007* 0.0000 
ROE →   BODOWN + BODAUD + BODIND + BODAGE + BSH+BSIZE+BDS -15.43969* 0.0000 
EPS →   BODOWN + BODAUD + BODIND + BODAGE + BSH+BSIZE+BDS -16.610052* 0.0000 
Source: Output data from E-views 10.0 
Notes: The ADF is the residual-based ADF statistic. The null hypothesis is no co-integration. (*) and (**) indicate that the estimated parameters are significant at 
the 1% and 5% level respectively. 
 
4.5 Panel OLS Analysis of Corporate Governance and Financial Performance of Deposit Money Banks in Nigeria 
A. Return on Assets and Corporate Governance 
The Hausman test in Table 6 suggests the preference of the random effect estimation to fixed effect due to insignificant p-value of the 
Chi-square. There is an insignificant positive relationship between return on assets and age of directors of the board of deposit money 
banks in Nigeria, whereas board ownership structure, audit committee, independence and block shareholding have insignificant 
negative relationship with return on assets. The coefficient of the constant 7.196817 indicates that if corporate governance variables are 
held constant, deposit money banks’ return on assets would rise by 719.68%. A unit rise in the age of the board results in 2.02% increase 
in return on assets. Return on assets would depreciate by 0.08%, 8.04%, 0.09% and 0.08% following a unit rise in board ownership 
structure, audit committee, independence and block shareholding. For the control/moderating variables, there is a positive significant 
relationship between the size of the banks’ and return on assets, while a significant negative relationship between capital/debt structure 
and return on assets. Invariably, a unit increase in banks’ total assets and debt structure lead to 524% rise and 2.66 depreciation in return 
on assets respectively. The adjusted R-square value of 0.067698 shows that the explanatory variables jointly accounted for 6.78% 
variations in return on assets of deposit money banks within the period of the study. The F-statistic which determine the overall 
significance joint influence of the independent variables shows that corporate governance and moderating variables significantly 
explained the variations in return on assets as the p-value is significant at 5% level (0.04 < 0.05). The Durbin Watson statistic of 1.89 
which is the traditional test of autocorrelation is within the acceptable range of no autocorrelation in a model. 
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Table 6: Panel OLS Regression Result of Return on Assets and Corporate Governance 
Variables Pooled OLS Fixed Effect Random Effect 
 Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C 6.728812 0.5673 9.275830 0.4350 7.196817 0.5372 
BODOWN -0.009045 0.6227 -0.007369 0.6867 -0.008816 0.6277 
BODAUD -0.070067 0.7335 -0.132663 0.5234 -0.080357 0.6937 
BODIND -0.010035 0.3770 -0.006737 0.5757 -0.009595 0.3977 
BODAGE 0.020251 0.7195 0.024683 0.6681 0.020209 0.7180 
BSH -0.008015 0.6481 -0.005053 0.7766 -0.007745 0.6564 
BSIZE 5.03E-10 0.0544 6.96E-10 0.0146 5.24E-10 0.0449 
BDS -0.026346 0.0162 -0.029778 0.0091 -0.026609 0.0146 
R-squared 0.127096  0.232359  0.130374  
Adjusted R-squared 0.064184  0.086507  0.067698  
S.E. of regression 2.099556  2.074363  2.080073  
Sum squared resid 489.3030  430.2980  480.2641  
Log likelihood -254.6020  -246.8918    
F-statistic 2.020214  1.593118  2.080132  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.050317  0.072454  0.043585  
Durbin-Watson stat 1.882383  1.791944  1.867988  
 Hausman Specification Test 
 Chi-Sq. Statistic 8.611971  
 P-value 0.376100  
Source: Output data from E-views 10.0 
Note: Periods included: 12, Cross-sections included: 10, Total Number of Observations: 120 
 
4.6 Return on Equity and Corporate Governance 
From the Hausman test in Table 7, the random effect is favoured as the p-value of the Chi-square is insignificant at 5% level. The result 
discloses that corporate governance reflected by audit committee, independence and block shareholding have insignificant negative 
relationship with return on equity. On the other hand, board ownership structure and age have insignificant positive relationship with 
return on equity of deposit money banks.  
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Table 7: Panel OLS Regression of Return on Equity and Corporate Governance 
Variables Pooled OLS Fixed Effect Random Effect 
 Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C 33.18963 0.6112 51.70416 0.4342 33.18963 0.6078 
BODOWN 0.060172 0.5530 0.082920 0.4126 0.060172 0.5492 
BODAUD -0.341287 0.7650 -0.768974 0.5059 -0.341287 0.7628 
BODIND -0.036579 0.5596 -0.010971 0.8688 -0.036579 0.5558 
BODAGE 0.042034 0.8930 0.077140 0.8090 0.042034 0.8919 
BSH -0.114883 0.2395 -0.112202 0.2589 -0.114883 0.2350 
BSIZE 3.63E-09 0.0137 4.65E-09 0.0038 3.63E-09 0.0129 
BDS -0.045214 0.4498 -0.066569 0.2851 -0.045214 0.4454 
R-squared 0.134441  0.235178  0.134441  
Adjusted R-squared 0.072059  0.089862  0.072059  
S.E. of regression 11.64138  11.52916  11.64138  
Sum squared resid 15042.90  13292.16  15042.90  
Log likelihood -460.1428  -452.7189    
F-statistic 2.155112  1.618388  2.155112  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.036362  0.065946  0.036362  
Durbin-Watson stat 1.842646  1.846575  1.842646  
 Hausman Specification Test 
 Chi-Sq. Statistic 10.950898  
 P-value 0.2045000  
Source: Output data from E-views 10.0 
Note: Periods included: 12, Cross-sections included: 10, Total Number of Observations: 120 
 
According to the constant coefficient of 33.18963, keeping board ownership structure, audit committee, independence, age and block 
shareholding, shareholders’ wealth would be 3,318%. Increasing audit committee, independence and block shareholding by a unit leads 
to 34.12%, 53.66% and 11.49% depreciation in shareholders wealth. Subsequently, increasing board ownership structure and age by one 
percent, return on equity would be up by factor of 76.02% and 4.20% respectively. The size of the banks’ still exhibited a positive 
significant relationship with return on equity as against banks’ debt structure that showed a negative insignificant relationship. 
Consequently, wealth of shareholders would increase by 363% owing to a unit increase in banks’ total assets, while a percentage increase 
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in debt structure of the banks’ leads to 4.52% decline in shareholders’ wealth. The F-statistic values of 2.155112 with a p-value of 0.036362 
show that the corporate governance variables jointly and significant explained the changes in return on equity of deposit money banks. 
Going by the adjusted R-squared of 0.072059, it is crystal clear that the explanatory variables accounted for only 7.21% changes in return 
on equity. It is also observed from the Durbin Watson statistic of 1.84 that the variables in the model are free from autocorrelation 
problem and inference deduced is reliable in statistical terms. 
 
C. Earnings per Share and Corporate Governance 
From the Hausman test in Table 8, the random effect is favoured as the p-value of the Chi-square is insignificant at 5% level. The result 
depicts that board ownership structure, audit committee, independence, age and block shareholding have insignificant negative 
relationship with earnings per share. The coefficient of the constant 340.7749 unveils that if corporate governance variables are held 
constant, earnings per share of deposit money banks would up by 340.77 kobo. A unit increase in board ownership structure, audit 
committee, independence and block shareholding would result in a corresponding decrease in earnings per share by a factor of 45.10, 
411, 42.0, 15.08 and 80.28 respectively. In terms of the control variable, a positive significant relationship was observed for earnings per 
share and size of the banks, while a negative insignificant relationship exists between debt structure of the banks and earnings per share. 
The F-statistic of 9.575219 with a p-value of 0.00 show that variables corporate governance jointly and significant explained the changes 
in earnings per share. Judging by the adjusted R-squared of 0.365678, it is crystal clear that the explanatory variables accounted for only 
36.57% changes in earnings per share. It is also observed from the Durbin Watson statistic of 2.1 that the variables in the model are free 
from autocorrelation problem and inference deduced is reliable in statistical terms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Benson Aisagbonbuomwan Esan, Amalachukwu Chijindu Ananwude, Ijeoma Chinwe Okeke 
EFFECT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF SELECTED DEPOSIT 
 MONEY BANKS QUOTED ON THE NIGERIAN STOCK EXCHANGE (2005 – 2017)
 
European Journal of Economic and Financial Research - Volume 4 │ Issue 1 │ 2020                                                         59 
Table 8: Panel OLS Regression of Earnings per Share and Corporate Governance 
Variables Pooled OLS Fixed Effect Random Effect 
 Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. 
C 340.7749 0.5458 439.0956 0.4474 340.7749 0.5468 
BODOWN -0.451086 0.5992 -0.421084 0.6265 -0.451086 0.6001 
BODAUD -4.114959 0.6754 -6.808074 0.4999 -4.114959 0.6762 
BODIND -0.420440 0.4353 -0.404612 0.4859 -0.420440 0.4364 
BODAGE -0.150796 0.9555 0.304593 0.9126 -0.150796 0.9556 
BSH -0.802277 0.3395 -0.637894 0.4591 -0.802277 0.3407 
BSIZE 4.17E-08 0.0033 4.99E-08 0.0026 4.17E-08 0.0034 
BDS -0.482940 0.3541 -0.579892 0.3001 -0.482940 0.3553 
R-squared 0.408321  0.464331  0.408321  
Adjusted R-squared 0.365678  0.362554  0.365678  
S.E. of regression 99.92360  100.1693  99.92360  
Sum squared resid 1108304.  1003390.  1108304.  
Log likelihood -718.1236  -712.1568    
F-statistic 9.575219  4.562232  9.575219  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
Durbin-Watson stat 2.123497  2.051489  2.123497  
 Hausman Specification Test 
 Chi-Sq. Statistic 9.292441  
 P-value 0.318200  
Source: Output data from E-views 10.0 
Note: Periods included: 12, Cross-sections included: 10, Total Number of Observations: 120 
 
D. Model Robustness  
The model robustness was realized by virtue of serial correlation LM test, heteroskedasticity Test and Ramsey Reset Specification. From 
the output in Table 9, the serial correlation LM test, heteroskedasticity Test and Ramsey Reset Specification evidence that the variables 
in the models pass robustness test as the p-values of the f-statistics for all the models are insignificant at 5% level of significant.  
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Table 9: Model Robustness 
 F-statistic Prob. 
Serial Correlation LM Test 
ROA →   BODOWN + BODAUD + BODIND + BODAGE + BSH+BSIZE+BDS 0.122969 0.7260 
ROE →   BODOWN + BODAUD + BODIND + BODAGE + BSH+BSIZE+BDS 0.155031 0.6490 
EPS →   BODOWN + BODAUD + BODIND + BODAGE + BSH+BSIZE+BDS 0.180797 0.0625 
 White Test of Heteroskedasticity   
ROA →   BODOWN + BODAUD + BODIND + BODAGE + BSH+BSIZE+BDS 36.41339 0.19485 
ROE →   BODOWN + BODAUD + BODIND + BODAGE + BSH+BSIZE+BDS 0.326460 0.06559 
EPS →   BODOWN + BODAUD + BODIND + BODAGE + BSH+BSIZE+BDS 43.26788 0.05548 
 Ramsey Reset Specification   
ROA →   BODOWN + BODAUD + BODIND + BODAGE + BSH+BSIZE+BDS 3.09155 0.08120 
ROE →   BODOWN + BODAUD + BODIND + BODAGE + BSH+BSIZE+BDS 3.72425 0.05600 
EPS →   BODOWN + BODAUD + BODIND + BODAGE + BSH+BSIZE+BDS 1.17803 0.28000 
Source: Output data from E-views 10.0 
 
E. Granger Causality Effect Result 
To examine the effect of corporate governance on financial performance of deposit money banks in Nigeria measured by return on 
assets, return on equity and earnings per share, the granger causality test was utilized. The idea of using granger causality over the 
panel ordinary least square regression is on the premise that the granger causality test is structured to depict the ability of one variable 
to predict another. This is unlike the panel OLS that only reveals relationship but cannot unveil the predicting power of one variable on 
the other. 
 
F. Return on Assets and Corporate Governance 
Table 10 reveals that it is only the age of board of directors of deposit money banks that has significant effect on return on assets. This 
is based on the fact that there is a unidirectional causal relationship between board age and return on assets of banks. Causality flows 
from board age to return on assets of banks at 5% level of significance. It is obvious that board ownership structure, audit committee, 
board independence and block shareholding have no significant effect on return on assets of deposit money banks as there is no evidence 
of causality flowing from either direction. 
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Table 10: Granger Causality Test for Return on Assets and Corporate Governance 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. Remarks 
BODOWN does not Granger Cause ROA 
ROA does not Granger Cause BODOWN 
120 
 
1.06041 
0.57288 
0.3052 
0.4506 
No Causality 
No Causality 
BODAUD does not Granger Cause ROA 
ROA does not Granger Cause BODAUD 
120 
 
0.02298 
0.10821 
0.8798 
0.7428 
No Causality 
No Causality 
BODIND does not Granger Cause ROA 
ROA does not Granger Cause BODIND 
120 
 
0.20398 
0.43582 
0.6524 
0.5104 
No Causality 
No Causality 
BODAGE does not Granger Cause ROA 
ROA does not Granger Cause BODAGE 
120 
 
6.72083 
0.56745 
0.0107 
0.4528 
Causality 
No Causality 
BSH does not Granger Cause ROA 
ROA does not Granger Cause BSH 
120 
 
1.44194 
0.12961 
0.2323 
0.7195 
No Causality 
No Causality 
BSIZE does not Granger Cause ROA 
ROA does not Granger Cause BSIZE 
120 
 
2.92435 
0.21955 
0.0899 
0.6403 
No Causality 
No Causality 
BDS does not Granger Cause ROA 
ROA does not Granger Cause BDS 
120 
 
0.07036 
0.16070 
0.7913 
0.6892 
No Causality 
No Causality 
Source: Output data from E-views 10.0 
 
G. Return on Equity and Corporate Governance 
From Table 11, the age of directors in the board and individuals/entities with block shareholding have significant effect on the return on 
equity of deposit money banks. There is a one way causal relationship between return on equity, board age and block shareholding at 
a significance level of 5%. Deposit money banks’ return on equity is not affected by ownership structure, audit committee and board 
independence. The size of the banks was found to have significant effect on return on equity as the p-value of 0.0246 is significant at 5% 
level of significance. 
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Table 11: Granger Causality Test for Return on Equity and Corporate Governance 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. Remarks 
BODOWN does not Granger Cause ROE 
ROE does not Granger Cause BODOWN 
120 
 
0.03915 
1.55561 
0.8435 
0.2148 
No Causality 
No Causality 
BODAUD does not Granger Cause ROE 
ROE does not Granger Cause BODAUD 
120 
 
0.39850 
0.35019 
0.5291 
0.5551 
No Causality 
No Causality 
BODIND does not Granger Cause ROE 
ROE does not Granger Cause BODIND 
120 
 
0.41480 
0.08778 
0.5208 
0.7675 
No Causality 
No Causality 
BODAGE does not Granger Cause ROE 
ROE does not Granger Cause BODAGE 
120 
 
5.01975 
0.95691 
0.0269 
0.3300 
Causality 
No Causality 
BSH does not Granger Cause ROE 
ROE does not Granger Cause BSH 
120 
 
5.52932 
0.16913 
0.0204 
0.6816 
Causality 
No Causality 
BSIZE does not Granger Cause ROE 
ROE does not Granger Cause BSIZE 
120 
 
5.18271 
0.36574 
0.0246 
0.5465 
Causality 
No Causality 
BDS does not Granger Cause ROE 
ROE does not Granger Cause BDS 
120 
 
3.00348 
0.18615 
0.0857 
0.6669 
No Causality 
No Causality 
Source: Output data from E-views 10.0 
 
E. Earnings per Share and Corporate Governance 
As can been in Table 12, earnings per share of deposit money banks is significantly affected by changes in age of board of directors as 
well as block shareholding. This is adduced based on the existence of unidirectional causal relationship observed between earnings per 
share, board age and block shareholding. Board ownership structure, audit committee and board independence do not determine the 
earnings per share of banks in Nigeria. In addition, there is a bidirectional relationship between earnings per share and size of the banks. 
This is to say that it the size of the banks that determines the amount of money that banks pay as dividend in one hand, while on the 
other hand, earnings per share of the banks determines the amount of branches to be establish as well as their assets. 
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Table 12: Granger Causality Test for Earnings per Share and Corporate Governance 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. Remarks 
BODOWN does not Granger Cause EPS 
EPS does not Granger Cause BODOWN 
120 
 
0.65112 
0.05878 
0.4213 
0.8089 
No Causality 
No Causality 
BODAUD does not Granger Cause EPS 
EPS does not Granger Cause BODAUD 
120 
 
0.78583 
0.62836 
0.3772 
0.4296 
No Causality 
No Causality 
BODIND does not Granger Cause EPS 
EPS does not Granger Cause BODIND 
120 
 
0.06386 
1.99385 
0.8009 
0.1606 
No Causality 
No Causality 
BODAGE does not Granger Cause EPS 
EPS does not Granger Cause BODAGE 
120 
 
5.03273 
0.18328 
0.0268 
0.6694 
Causality 
No Causality 
BSH does not Granger Cause EPS 
EPS does not Granger Cause BSH 
120 
 
4.61081 
1.07498 
0.0338 
0.3020 
Causality 
No Causality 
BSIZE does not Granger Cause EPS 
EPS does not Granger Cause BSIZE 
120 
 
6.14905 
7.46655 
0.0146 
0.0073 
Causality 
Causality 
BDS does not Granger Cause EPS 
EPS does not Granger Cause BDS 
120 
 
3.36053 
0.00932 
0.0693 
0.9232 
No Causality 
No Causality 
Source: Output data from E-views 10.0. 
 
F. Highlight of our Findings 
Table 6 reveals that there is a negative relationship between board independence and return on assets of deposit money banks in Nigeria. 
This may be attributed to the fact that the appointment of members into the board are majorly based on friendship rather than 
experience. In Nigeria banking sector, most directors use their power to influence management decisions and undermine the proper 
functioning of the board, thereby affecting bank performance negatively. This findings agree with the agency theory that as board size 
becomes large, the agency problem related to director free-riding increases and will give the managers the spaces to pursue their own 
interests instead of aligning the interests of the shareholders which lowers firm performance. This supports the findings of Adigwe, 
Nwanna and John (2016) and Abobakr (2017) but disagrees with Ene and Alem (2016) and Uadiale (2016). The result on the relationship 
between board independence and return on assets discloses that a higher independence of the board would lead to appreciation in 
performance of banks in Nigeria expressed via return on assets.  
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 In Table 7 there was evidence of positive relationship between board ownership 
structure, age of the board of directors and return on equity of deposit money banks. This 
favours the agency cost theory that the greater the share board members have in the firm, 
the greater the costs they will incur for not maximising the wealth of shareholders. Hence, 
aligning the interests between principals and agents resolves for the agency problem and 
achieves the main goal of the shareholders, which is value maximization, consequently 
affecting firm performance positively. This is in line with Odili, Ezeudu and Orikara 
(2015), Hoque, Islam and Ahmed (2013) and Ermina (2010). The negative relationship 
between independence of the board affirms the study of Pan (2014), Vesna and Kiril 
(2014), Ogege and Bolupremo (2014) but disagree with Shungu, Ngirande and Ndlovu 
(2014) and Mohammed and Tank (2015). 
 The negative nexus between earnings per share and block shareholding in Table 8 
is in unison with the work of Alam and Bangledesh (2017) that block shareholding 
decreases financial performance of banks. Nevertheless, disagree with the result of 
Ermina (2010). The negative relationship between block shareholding and earnings per 
share supports the agency theory that higher ownership concentration could induce the 
prioritisation of self-interest by large shareholders and the consequent expropriation of 
firm resources resulting in decreased firm performance. The negative relationship 
between board independence and earnings per share might be that non-executive 
director are not involved in day to day affairs of the banks; this will undermine their 
ability to monitor and advise the board because of the lack of the information that they 
have which will reduce the non-executive director ability to apply their function 
efficiently. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
 
This study examines the effect of corporate governance variables on financial 
performance of deposit money banks. Corporate governance is an important issue 
because of the rise in corporate scandal suffered by corporate organisations arising from 
insider abuse by management board, and other financial recklessness. The result from 
the analysis establishes that corporate governance practice has significant effect on 
financial performance of deposit money banks in Nigeria, however, such effect is 
marginal considering the number of corporate governance variables that significantly 
affect return on assets, return on equity and earnings per share. As a result, good 
corporate governance practice should not be regarded as a threat to entrepreneurial drive 
and spirit but a gauge to promoting integrity and transparency in financial reports. 
 Appointment into the board should be on the bases of age and experience not on 
friendship since it positively relates to performance and to the probability of disciplinary 
management turnover in poorly performing banks. Corporate governance efforts should 
focus on ownership structure of the board. Board members should not be encouraged to 
earn too much stake in the ownership structure of the banks as it is negatively related 
with performance. The holding of block shares of the banks by individuals, institutional 
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investors or agencies should be discouraged because block shareholding could induce 
the prioritisation of self-interest by block shareholders and the consequent expropriation 
of firm resources, resulting in decreased bank performance. 
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